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THE POWER OF ARGUMENTS: HOW ENTREPRENEURS CONVINCE 
STAKEHOLDERS OF THE LEGITIMATE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THEIR 
VENTURES 
 
Entrepreneurs gain positive evaluations when their stakeholders are convinced 
that a new venture is simultaneously legitimate and distinct. Prior research 
highlights that analogies are a powerful device for constructing such legitimate 
distinctiveness. We extend this work by providing a more comprehensive 
typology of arguments that, besides analogies, contains five additional 
arguments that entrepreneurs can use to gain legitimacy and support for their 
ventures. We use this rhetorical typology in turn to consider how the nature of 
the business concept associated with a new venture constrains the choice, and 
effects, of certain arguments. Our typology provides a base for future research 
on the micro-discursive processes through which entrepreneurs claim, and in 
turn achieve, legitimate distinctiveness for their ventures.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms that are similar to other organizations in their institutional environment, but at the same 
time differ from those organizations, have been found to perform well on a variety of measures, 
such as organizational productivity (Jennings et al., 2009), return on assets (Deephouse, 1999; 
McNamara et al., 2003; Norman et al., 2007), and product innovation (Tan et al., 2013). These 
findings suggest that founders of new ventures need to persuade stakeholders that their firm 
simultaneously fits in with, and stands out from, other ventures and businesses in its environment 
– that is, it is legitimately distinct (e.g., Jennings et al., 2009; Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Navis 
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and Glynn, 2011). Most scholars describe the task of actually combining legitimacy and 
distinctiveness as complicated (Chaney and Marshall, 2013; Tan et al., 2013), given the 
seemingly contradictory goals of claiming similarity to, and difference from, other ventures and 
businesses. The question that this raises is how entrepreneurs are able to acquire such legitimate 
distinctiveness for their ventures, and specifically what rhetorical strategies they may use to this 
end. In other words, in this paper we set out to answer the following question: how can founders 
of new ventures convince stakeholders that their firm is both legitimate and distinct? 
 
To address this question, we first discuss prior work on the notion of legitimate distinctiveness, 
which generally assumes that stakeholders compare organizations in broader terms and assign 
them to relevant categories (King and Whetten, 2008), such as markets or industries. Once a firm 
has been evaluated as being a legitimate member of a particular category, stakeholders will start 
making within-category distinctions between firms (Bitektine, 2011; Lamertz et al., 2005). When 
making these within-category comparisons, stakeholders assess whether an organization is 
distinctive from other organizations in the same category. In order to get stakeholder support, 
entrepreneurs therefore need to obtain the legitimacy that flows from being a member of a 
category, while at the same time highlighting their firm’s distinctiveness from other rival firms. 
We argue that the careful use of arguments can help entrepreneurs present and build a firm that is 
likely to be perceived as legitimately distinct. Specifically, we turn to insights drawn from 
argumentation theory (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960; Perelman, 2008; Rieke and Sillars, 2001) 
that allows us to develop a typology of arguments that are available to entrepreneurs to persuade 
stakeholders that their venture is both legitimate and has distinctive potential. Our focus is on 
nascent entrepreneurs – individuals who are ‘in the process of establishing a business venture’ 
(Dimov, 2010: 1126) – as these entrepreneurs have not yet realized any tangible results and are 
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therefore most dependent on argumentation to convince stakeholders. We highlight how the 
freedom these entrepreneurs have to choose certain arguments is constrained, and how, 
depending on the specific nature of the business concept, a certain set of arguments is more (or 
less) likely to garner legitimate distinctiveness, and in turn support from key stakeholders.  
 
In developing this overall argument, we aim to make three contributions. First, the typology that 
we develop advances the limited work on argumentation in entrepreneurship by providing a 
more comprehensive overview of the types of argumentation that entrepreneurs may, and indeed 
do, use to influence stakeholders. Prior work on the rhetorical efforts of entrepreneurs has mainly 
focused on the role of analogies (Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010; Etzion and Ferraro, 2010; Hill 
and Levenhagen, 1995; Navis and Glynn, 2011), and fails to acknowledge that other arguments 
can effectively be used to convince stakeholders of a new venture’s legitimate distinctiveness. 
Our typology therefore includes five additional arguments, and specifies their effects on 
stakeholders’ evaluations of new ventures, thus broadening the perspective of future research on 
the argumentation strategies of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, we discuss the constraints around 
using specific arguments. Although entrepreneurs may have some freedom to choose certain 
arguments (Corvellec and Risberg, 2007; Golant and Sillince, 2007; Martens et al., 2007), such 
choices, as we will demonstrate, are significantly curtailed. In particular, when an entrepreneur 
develops a radically novel business concept, we expect that assigning the firm to a legitimate 
category of organizations is difficult due to the lack of similarities with existing organizations. 
As a consequence, fewer grounds are available to support legitimating claims. The lack of 
grounds makes it harder for entrepreneurs to support their claims with evidence, and eventually 
gain legitimacy for their ventures. Equally, due to the inherently uncertain nature of radically 
novel undertakings (Navis and Glynn, 2011, Rosa et al., 1999; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009), the 
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warrants in these arguments also remain weak. We discuss these kinds of conditions as well as 
the overall constraints associated with using certain types of arguments to claim legitimate 
distinctiveness for a novel venture. 
 
Our second contribution relates to the notion of legitimate distinctiveness itself. A firm is 
endowed with cognitive legitimacy when stakeholders assign it to a certain class of organizations 
(Bitektine, 2011), either by stressing similarities with established members of this class or by 
highlighting the differences with members of other classes. Although judgments on a firm’s 
cognitive legitimacy are commonly made at an abstract level, involving an entire category 
(Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Reinecke et al., 2012), creating legitimate distinctiveness also 
involves comparing a firm to and contrasting it with other organizations within the same 
category (Gioia et al., 2010; Lamertz et al., 2005; Tan et al., 2013; Voronov et al., 2013). Prior 
work on legitimate distinctiveness has not specified which instruments entrepreneurs use to 
influence stakeholder assessments of the extent to which a particular venture is similar to or 
different from other firms. Using the typology we develop, we specify the argumentation 
strategies that entrepreneurs use to claim and establish legitimate distinctiveness for their 
ventures. In doing so, we add much needed detail on the micro-processes that lead to an outcome 
where legitimate distinctiveness is attributed to a venture. For example, entrepreneurs who 
introduce a radically novel business are generally only able to contrast their firm with other 
organizations, and cannot easily assign their firm to an existing class of organizations. In their 
case, legitimate distinctiveness is not purely a matter of arguing that a venture belongs to one 
category rather than another, but also involves increasing comprehensibility through explaining 
its activities. By discussing these kinds of rhetorical arguments that entrepreneurs have at their 
disposal, to both assign a new venture to a market category and compare it to other members of 
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that particular category, we aim to flesh out the micro-processes of argumentation that lead to the 
attribution of legitimate distinctiveness to a new venture. 
 
Third, we contribute to a growing body of research (Clarke & Cornelissen, 2011; Phillips and 
Oswick, 2012; Steyaert, 2007) that incorporates a linguistic focus into entrepreneurship research. 
Researchers have advocated language and narrative approaches to explain the mechanisms 
underlying entrepreneurial phenomena (Martens et al., 2007) and to better understand 
entrepreneurial intentions and actions (Gartner, 2010). Prior studies in this vein have examined 
how the narratives entrepreneurs tell can help them acquire legitimacy and resources (Golant and 
Sillince, 2007; Martens et al., 2007), as well as how the terms they borrow from dominant 
discourses (Arbuthnott et al., 2010; Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010: Navis and Glynn, 2011) help 
them to convince stakeholders. Our study joins this stream of research and elaborates theory on 
how nascent entrepreneurs may use different types of arguments during interactions with 
potential resource providers. With this theory elaboration, we not only provide further breadth 
and depth to the range of argumentation strategies that new venture founders use, but we also 
signal the fruitfulness of a rhetoric-informed perspective on entrepreneurship, alongside other 
communication and language-informed approaches, such as narrative and discourse analysis. 
Specifically, by adopting a rhetorical perspective we are able to increase our understanding of 
the mechanisms through which entrepreneurs present their firm as both legitimate and distinct. 
But we also expand the perspective itself by discussing how the linguistic freedom of 
entrepreneurs is constrained by the characteristics of the business concept they develop, thereby 
delimiting the area within which entrepreneurs’ rhetorical efforts take place. 
 
6 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of prior 
entrepreneurship research on legitimate distinctiveness. We then introduce our typology and 
discuss in detail the specific arguments that entrepreneurs can use to claim legitimate 
distinctiveness for their ventures. As part of this discussion, we demonstrate with examples from 
prior work that the choice for, and the subsequent strength of, particular types of arguments 
depend on the novelty of the business concept associated with a venture. We conclude with an 
overview of our typology and arguments, highlight the paper’s contributions, and elaborate the 
implications for further research.  
 
2. STAKEHOLDER JUDGMENTS OF NEW VENTURES 
The mortality rate of new firms is high compared to established firms (Deutsch and Ross, 2003; 
Rao et al., 2008), mainly because stakeholders are often reluctant to commit to novel ventures 
and therefore do not provide them with the initial resources they need to survive (Clarke, 2011; 
Tornikowski and Newbert, 2007). Reluctance among stakeholders stems from the difficulty they 
have when assessing a new firm’s potential for success (Dushnitsky, 2010), due to the limited 
availability of information on these firms (Higgins and Gulati, 2006; Stuart et al., 1999). Their 
reluctance will be exacerbated when a venture is nascent, i.e. when the pursued opportunity is 
perceptual in nature rather than supported by actual results (Dimov, 2010), and when the 
proposed venture operates in a new industry (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), and thus develops a novel 
business concept. We define a business concept as the basic capabilities and product or service 
offering associated with a new venture. A new venture’s business concept can involve an 
incremental variation on existing business concepts in a particular market or industry 
(Carayannopoulos, 2009) or, alternatively, a more radical revision that constitutes to a greater or 
lesser degree a new category of thinking (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). In the latter case, 
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stakeholders generally lack the cognitive norms, models, scripts, and patterns of behavior 
(Déjean et al., 2004; Navis and Glynn, 2011; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) they need to 
understand the new firm (Navis and Glynn, 2010). 
 
Addressing these challenges requires that new venture founders, especially those that introduce a 
novel business concept, provide stakeholders with the information they need to grasp what the 
firm is doing. In other words, trying to acquire legitimacy is a vital task for entrepreneurs 
(Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Legitimacy is defined as a ‘generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995: 574), and consists of two 
dimensions: cognitive and sociopolitical (or normative) legitimacy (e.g. Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Bitektine, 2011). Cognitive legitimacy involves cognitive judgments of a venture’s 
comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995), whereas 
sociopolitical legitimacy is a broader normative construct that results from a fit between a 
proposed venture and the broader worldviews of stakeholders (Golant and Sillince, 2007; Green 
and Li, 2011; Rutherford et al., 2009). Because we aim to find out how new venture founders 
help stakeholders understand that the characteristics of their firm are both different from and 
similar to other organizations, our discussion of legitimacy will, in line with prior research 
(Navis & Glynn, 2010), focus only on its cognitive dimension. 
 
Cognitive legitimacy is central to help stakeholders understand a novel venture. An organization 
is evaluated as cognitively legitimate when it is taken for granted or comprehensible (Suddaby 
and Greenwood, 2005). Taken-for-grantedness is the ultimate form of cognitive legitimacy 
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Choi and Shepherd, 2005; Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003) because it is 
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a lasting form of cognitive support (Suchman, 1995). Stakeholders of a taken-for-granted 
organization are so familiar with it that they no longer actively think about it (Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994), i.e. they see the organization as a ‘given’ (Suchman, 1995). However, since knowledge 
about the activities of a new venture is not widespread (Rutherford et al., 2009; Wiklund et al., 
2010), these firms are not likely to be seen yet as taken for granted by their stakeholders 
(Rutherford and Buller, 2007). Founders of new ventures are therefore more likely to attain a 
favorable cognitive legitimacy judgment if they manage to render their firm more 
comprehensible to stakeholders. Comprehensibility relates to the plausibility of the firm 
(Suchman, 1995; Pollack et al., 2012), and is a more episodic cognitive assessment than taken-
for-grantedness (Suchman, 1995).  
 
Generally speaking, there are two ways in which entrepreneurs can enhance the 
comprehensibility of a new venture. First, they can categorize their firm in a group of 
organizations that is taken for granted (Lamertz et al., 2005), for instance by implementing the 
widely accepted practices that these organizations employ (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). 
Second, entrepreneurs can spread knowledge about a new venture (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2003) in order to help stakeholders realize that the venture idea makes 
sense (Suchman, 1995).  
 
Although novelty comes with certain disadvantages, ‘a degree of deviance or distinctiveness 
might be necessary or beneficial as well’ (Voronov et al., 2013: 609) in order to reduce 
competition (Carayannopoulos, 2009; Deephouse, 1999). Similar to the construct of legitimacy, 
distinctiveness appears to have a cognitive and a normative dimension. The first dimension 
concerns to what extent a new venture is different from its rivals, in the sense that its attributes 
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are not similar to those of prototypical members of their category (Navis and Glynn, 2011). The 
normative dimension involves an evaluation and weighing of whether the firm is doing better 
than other organizations on some measure of performance (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2011). Ideally, 
new ventures meet the criteria for both dimensions (Carayannopoulos, 2009; King and Whetten, 
2008), i.e. create ‘a perception that a firm is positively different from its competitors’ (Chaney 
and Marshall, 2013: 1551). Because normative evaluations of new ventures are beyond the scope 
of this paper, we will focus on the cognitive dimension of distinctiveness. 
 
Navis and Glynn (2011) argue that new venture proposals will most likely receive a favorable 
judgment when they ‘consist of legitimating claims that align the entrepreneurial endeavor with 
expectations arising from institutionalized conventions and consist of distinctiveness claims that 
distance it from such institutionalized conventions in ways that are meaningful’ (Ibid.: 480). 
Hence, a crucial task for founders of new ventures is convincing stakeholders that their firm both 
fits in and stands out from its environment. Because both legitimacy and distinctiveness arise 
from processes of comparison (King and Whetten, 2008), convincing stakeholders of a firm’s 
legitimate distinctiveness involves comparing it to other organizations. Comparisons are 
facilitated by categories (Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010; Porac et al., 1995), so in their attempts to 
show that their firm is legitimately distinct, entrepreneurs will relate it to existing categories of 
organizations. When seeking cognitive legitimacy, entrepreneurs benefit from demonstrating that 
their venture is similar to other members of a particular category (Lamertz et al., 2005). This also 
implies that when a firm does not share all the characteristics with the prototypical members of 
that category, it may be seen as cognitively distinct. 
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King and Whetten (2008) argue that stakeholders who evaluate whether an organization is 
legitimately distinct make two types of comparison: between-category and within-category. With 
respect to between-category comparisons, the pressure to be both legitimate and distinct appears 
to be conflicting. In order to be seen as member of a certain category of organizations a new 
venture has to meet the minimum standards of membership (King and Whetten, 2008). Firms 
that deviate significantly from these standards are less likely to be evaluated as legitimate 
members of that category (Deephouse, 1999; Hargadon and Douglas, 2001), and run the risk of 
being penalized (Alvarez et al., 2005; Zuckerman, 1999). Therefore, with respect to between-
category classifications of organizations, cognitive legitimacy and distinctiveness have been 
characterized as ‘opposing needs’ (Alvarez et al., 2005: 864), ‘oppositional tugs’ (Navis and 
Glynn, 2011: 493), and involving a ‘trade-off’ (Deephouse, 1999: 153; Norman et al., 2007: 
1137).  
 
However, once an organization meets the minimum standards of category membership, 
stakeholders will start making within-category distinctions (King and Whetten, 2008; Lamertz et 
al., 2005). As a consequence, legitimate members of organizational categories attempt to 
cognitively distinguish themselves from other members of the same category (Pedersen and 
Dobbin, 2006; Reinecke et al., 2012; Ruebottom, 2013). These actors thus position their 
legitimating claims and distinctiveness claims at separate levels (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; 
King and Whetten, 2008): they claim legitimacy by conveying that they meet the standards for 
category membership (thereby attempting to influence stakeholders’ between-category 
comparisons), and they claim distinctiveness by setting themselves apart from other members of 
that category (hence addressing within-category comparisons). In so doing, it is possible to 
create a venture with a moderate level of strategic similarity to other ventures, while at the same 
11 
time articulating and claiming a distinct position. Hence, when claims to legitimacy and 
distinctiveness are made at separate levels, they do not function as two opposing ends on a 
continuum, but operate in parallel to one another (Gioia et al., 2010; Tan et al., 2013; Voronov et 
al., 2013).  
 
We now turn to how the novelty of the business concept of new venture founders affects their 
ability to convince stakeholders of the legitimate distinctiveness of their firm. Prior research on 
legitimate distinctiveness has argued that entrepreneurs can claim membership of a certain 
market category (e.g. King and Whetten, 2008; Navis and Glynn, 2011). We will argue that 
entrepreneurs who launch a radically innovative product or service, i.e. a business concept that is 
highly novel and thereby disrupts the status quo (Carayannopoulos, 2009; Lounsbury and Glynn, 
2001), face different obstacles in making convincing claims than those selling more 
incrementally novel products or services. This is because incrementally novel business concepts 
remain consistent with the minimum standards of a category, whereas radical innovations change 
those standards (Jennings et al., 2009) and create a novel market category. In order to identify 
how novelty influences claims to legitimate distinctiveness, we will first provide an overview of 
the types of claims entrepreneurs can make to convince stakeholders that their firm 
simultaneously fits in and stands out. 
 
3. USING ARGUMENTS TO INFLUENCE JUDGMENTS OF A NEW VENTURE 
Prior studies of the attempts of entrepreneurs to obtain favorable stakeholder assessments of a 
new venture point out that rhetoric is a valuable instrument (e.g. Holt and Macpherson, 2010; 
Rindova et al., 2009; Ruebottom, 2013). Despite the fact that the potential grounds for a variety 
of arguments have been identified by prior research (see Table 1), these studies have only 
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specified few actual devices that can be used to make legitimating and/or distinctiveness claims. 
The argument by analogy seems to be an exception. A number of studies have argued that 
analogical reasoning can facilitate the comprehension of a new venture (Cornelissen and Clarke, 
2010; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995), and others have stated that analogical work can, additionally, 
‘emphasize modification and contrast between source and target domains, and not just 
equivalence or similarity’ (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010: 1104). Based on work by scholars of 
argumentation (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960; Perelman, 2008; Rieke and Sillars, 2001), we 
argue that new venture founders have in fact a much broader repertoire of arguments at their 
disposal to claim legitimate distinctiveness. We draw these arguments together in a typology that 
includes six types of argument: arguments by analogy, classification, generalization, cause, and 
sign, and arguments from authority. Table 1 provides a summary overview of our typology. 
 
- Insert table 1 about here - 
 
We will introduce each of these arguments in turn, and discuss how each one is effectively used 
by entrepreneurs as support for a legitimating claim, a distinctiveness claim, or both. Each type 
of argument will be illustrated by two examples, where possible drawn from prior studies on new 
ventures. The first example indicates how the argument can be used to claim legitimacy, and the 
second shows its distinguishing effect. Because ‘a bare conclusion, without any data produced in 
its support, is no argument’ (Toulmin 1994: 106), we do not only discuss an argument’s claim, 
but also introduce two additional basic components of an argument: the grounds and the warrant 
(Figure 1 below).  
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If an arguer, for example fume cupboard manufacturer Ian, claims that the ‘cupboards that we 
are making now are probably better and safer than any that have ever been made’ (Holt and 
Macpherson 2010: 32), his audience may be hesitant to believe him. In order to convince them, 
Ian needs to complete his argument by introducing a ground. According to Toulmin et al. (1984), 
grounds are the data or foundational reasons that an arguer refers to as support for a conclusion. 
So to convince stakeholders that the fume cupboards his firm produces are indeed of superior 
quality and safety, Ian explained that all cupboards are subject to quality control: ‘we make sure 
that everything is tested on the gas, that there’s no leakages at all, we make sure that the sash 
mechanism is safe’ (Holt and Macpherson 2010: 32).  
 
For a claim to be accepted as plausible, however, merely presenting grounds does not suffice. 
The claim actually has to follow from the grounds, i.e. the step that is made from grounds to 
claim should be clear. It is the function of a warrant to bridge these two elements, and thereby 
carry the data to the claim (Brockriede and Ehninger 1960; Toulmin 1994). As such, a warrant 
helps to explicate the seemingly logical connection between the grounds and the claim. In our 
example, the implied warrant is the causal relation between Ian’s actions (the testing) and the 
safety of the product. Usually these warrants are largely implicit as they offer no new content but 
give force to an argument. In our discussion of the typology we however make these warrants 
explicit, as part of the strength of the ensuing argumentation (Berente et al. 2011: 693; 
Bouwmeester 2013: 419). Figure 1 presents the three basic elements of an argument, and shows 
how the grounds and claim in Ian’s argument are connected by an implicit warrant.  
 
- Insert Figure 1 about here -  
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Argumentation theory (Toulmin, 1994) distinguishes further elements as part of this 
microstructure of an argument – such as rebuttals, qualifiers, and backing for the warrant – but 
we focus here on the core structure of arguments. The reason for doing so is that we aim to 
establish the force of specific arguments when claiming legitimacy and distinctiveness, in 
contrast to a focus on how chains of complex argumentation evolve over time in interactions 
between entrepreneurs and stakeholders.  
 
3.1 Argument by analogy 
Argumentation scholars suggest that an unknown situation can be clarified by comparing it to a 
more familiar case, i.e. by drawing an analogy (Perelman, 2008). In an argument by analogy, the 
arguer suggests that a characteristic that can be found in one situation also exists in another 
situation (Rieke and Sillars, 2001). As stated above, prior research (e.g. Cornelissen and Clarke, 
2010; Etzion and Ferraro, 2010; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995) has studied the use of analogies by 
new venture founders, suggesting that founders of start-up firms can use metaphors and 
analogies to ‘draw on existing linguistic repertoires to anchor new interpretations in already 
familiar categories of meaning’ (Navis and Glynn, 2011: 490) and to highlight ‘differences and 
not just similarities between [an] analogical source and target’ (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010: 1104).  
 
3.1.1 Using arguments by analogy to enhance cognitive legitimacy 
We argue that grounds for claiming cognitive legitimacy by means of an argument by analogy 
are generally available. Entrepreneurs who make incremental changes to a business concept can 
draw from a large pool of grounds because similarities with other organizations within the 
industry will be apparent from the start. New venture founders trying to legitimize a radical 
innovation have to put more effort into identifying these grounds because their product or service 
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is, by definition, distinct from what other organizations within a particular industry offer. 
Nevertheless, for two reasons we expect that these entrepreneurs are able to find grounds for 
making a legitimizing argument by analogy. First, they may extend the analogy metaphorically, 
and thus stress the similarities with established business concepts in more remotely related 
industries. Second, they can themselves create the grounds for their argument, which is not 
uncommon: ‘successful mimicry is often combined with analogical work that highlights 
conformity to existing templates’ (Slager et al., 2012: 776). 
 
With respect to the warrant in an argument by analogy, stakeholders may find that, in addition to 
the similarity that is highlighted in the analogy, there are differences between the novel concept 
and existing products and services. If they decide that the differences outweigh the similarities, 
they can conclude that the analogy does not hold because the misfit dominates and thus causes 
‘all kinds of distortions’ (Majone, 1989: 64). In making this judgment, the stakeholders do not 
question the data because they do not deny that there are similarities. Rather, they doubt whether 
a particular similarity justifies the claim that the novel business concept is indeed similar to 
existing concepts in any relevant sense. We argue that stakeholders are more likely to question a 
warrant when the business concept that entrepreneurs introduce is radically novel than when it is 
incrementally novel. As we argued above, entrepreneurs of radically novel concepts may refer to 
similarities with firms in other industries as the grounds on which a legitimizing argument by 
analogy is based. Hence, the gap between grounds and claim in such instances tends to be wider, 
i.e. the argument by analogy used to legitimize the business concept rests on a weaker warrant.  
 
A concrete example of the use of analogy is provided by Etzion and Ferraro (2010), who studied 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a non-profit organization aiming to develop an 
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international standard for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. GRI-
based reports were structured in a way that resembled financial reports: 
 
In the same way that annual ﬁnancial reports typically contain interpretive material in the front end and 
ﬁnancial statements in the back, so too should GRI-based reports strive for a clear distinction between the 
reporting organisation’s interpretation of information and factual presentation (Ibid.: 1099). 
 
By emphasizing the similarity between the structure of GRI-based reports and financial reports 
(ground), the initiators of the GRI claim that reporting on environmental and social performance 
is as routine and rigorous as financial reporting (claim). The entrepreneurs thus help their 
stakeholders understand that sustainability reporting – although it initially seems very distinct 
from traditional reporting – shares many relevant characteristics with financial reporting 
(warrant). Because the comprehensibility of a taken-for-granted category spills over to its target 
(Suchman, 1995; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), the argument by analogy used by the founders of 
the GRI convinced stakeholders of the cognitive legitimacy of their venture.  
 
The example illustrates that entrepreneurs who develop a radically novel business concept have 
to invest effort in finding solid grounds to support the analogy. The lack of similar initiatives led 
the initiators of the GRI to actively make sustainability reporting look more like traditional 
reporting by copying the structure of financial reports. Nevertheless, they were able to construct 
a plausible argument by analogy. The warrant of the argument, however, is relatively weak due 
to the newness of the concept. Stakeholders may wonder whether the similarity GRI created by 
copying the structure of financial reports may be outweighed by differences on other aspects, 
such as the accounting methods used. 
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3.1.2 Using arguments by analogy to emphasize distinctiveness  
Analogies can also be used to claim that the product offered by a new venture is cognitively 
distinct from any prior or existing solutions. The basis for an argument by analogy is often a 
relationship between two items that arguers see as similar to another pair of items (Brockriede 
and Ehninger, 1960). Attempting to claim distinctiveness by means of an argument by analogy 
thus creates the paradoxical situation that entrepreneurs need to identify a similar instance of 
distinctiveness. When a business concept is radically novel there is a smaller number of similarly 
distinctive cases. Nevertheless, we expect that entrepreneurs who introduce a highly novel 
product or service are able to ground their claims by drawing more on figurative analogies or 
metaphors (Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010). 
 
Warrants are more strongly affected by the novelty of a business concept. Because a highly novel 
concept is by definition ambiguous, its features are yet unknown (Navis and Glynn, 2011). 
Hence, it will be hard to plausibly claim that it is similar to other distinctive concepts. 
Incremental innovations are more closely related to the distinctiveness of other products within a 
market category, which makes the warrant stronger. As a consequence, it is easier to convince 
stakeholders that the analogy holds. 
 
Navis and Glynn (2010) describe how the founders of Sirius, one of the two firms that was 
licensed to broadcast satellite radio in the US, tried to distinguish their product from the services 
provided by the broadcasters of terrestrial radio: Sirius’ ‘service will bring to radio what cable 
networks have brought to television’ (Ibid.: 452). In this example, Sirius’ founders suggest that 
satellite radio is an improvement over terrestrial radio (claim) in the same way as cable networks 
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were an improvement over traditional broadcast television (ground). The founders of Sirius thus 
used an argument by analogy (warrant) to convince stakeholders of the distinctiveness of their 
firm.  
 
The example suggests that entrepreneurs who develop a radically novel business concept may 
have to search outside of their immediate environment for grounds for an argument by analogy. 
Satellite radio had not yet established itself as a market category by the time the founders of 
Sirius drew the analogy with cable networks (Navis and Glynn, 2010). Although we generally 
argue that the novelty of a business concept negatively affects the strength of the warrant in an 
argument by analogy, the warrant in this example is surprisingly strong. Even though Sirius’ 
business concept was a radical departure from established ways of radio broadcasting, the 
entrepreneurs found a similar case of distinctiveness. Furthermore, the highly novel way in 
which Sirius transmits a radio signal to its customers does not weaken the warrant because radio 
and television can both be categorized as media and therefore belong to the same overarching 
category. The example thus illustrates that, despite the general weakness of warrants in 
arguments by analogy put forward by entrepreneurs who launch a radically novel business 
concept, they can still be a suitable rhetorical device for these entrepreneurs, providing they find 
a matching figurative extension.  
 
3.2 Argument by classification 
Analogies often relate an unknown phenomenon to a known comparable case. A similar effect 
can be realized by introducing an argument by classification, which assumes that a generalized 
conclusion about known members of a class applies to a hitherto unexamined item or example 
(Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960). In an argument by classification, therefore, the generalized 
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conclusion is already accepted, and the specific case serves as an illustration of this general 
conclusion (Perelman, 2008). The applicability of the conclusion to the specific case is taken for 
granted by the arguer, who thus assigns the case to the general category. Because categories 
function as models that describe the features of its members, thereby providing cognitive 
economy (Porac et al., 1995) and generating shared understandings among relevant actors 
(Khaire and Wadhwani, 2010), arguments by classification can be very useful to founders of new 
firms.  
 
3.2.1 Using arguments by classification to enhance cognitive legitimacy 
Entrepreneurs who introduce a radically novel concept, we argue, generally have a hard time 
identifying suitable grounds to support an argument by classification. Because highly novel 
market categories are ‘ill formed, in flux, and without a clear prototype or exemplar’ (Navis and 
Glynn, 2011: 486), there are few generalized conclusions that can be applied to the novel 
business concept. Furthermore, stakeholders may question the strength of the warrant in such a 
general argument by classification. As much is unknown about radically novel ventures, they are 
likely to doubt if the ventures indeed belong to the class described by the general statement 
referred to in the ground. 
 
Prior entrepreneurship studies provide examples of the use of arguments by classification by 
founders of start-up firms. In Tracey et al.’s (2011: 65) study of Aspire, a social enterprise 
aiming to provide employment to homeless people, one of the firm’s founders stated that ‘most 
charities rely on the whims of foundations over whether they receive a grant and can’t plan more 
than three years ahead. Because we are running a business, we can look 10 to 20 years into the 
future.’  
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In this example, the entrepreneur transfers a general statement – contrary to charities, businesses 
have the ability to plan ahead (ground) – to his venture. By stating that Aspire is a business and 
thus belongs to this category (warrant), the founder suggests that the general statement about 
businesses applies to his firm (claim). He hereby wants to help stakeholders understand that 
although Aspire’s approach to helping the homeless may be new, it is an established way of 
working in other contexts. Hence, arguments by classification can be used to enhance a new 
venture’s cognitive legitimacy. 
 
The example illustrates that finding grounds for a legitimizing argument by classification is more 
challenging when a venture introduces a radically novel concept – as the notion of social 
enterprise was when Aspire was set up (Tracey et al. 2011). The entrepreneurs therefore decided 
to ground their claim by referring to a highly generic conclusion about businesses. If a larger 
number of generalized conclusions about social enterprises had been available, social 
entrepreneurs like the founders of Aspire could have more easily identified grounds specific to 
their firm. Stakeholders of Aspire may however have questioned the warrant in the 
entrepreneurs’ argument by asking whether an organization that aims to ‘help the homeless 
rather than generate wealth for its owners’ (Tracey et al., 2011: 67) can truly be a business.  
 
3.2.2 Using arguments by classification to emphasize distinctiveness  
Although we argued that, generally speaking, generalized conclusions about existing market 
categories are widely available and can therefore be used as grounds to claim cognitive 
legitimacy, the category-specific nature of these conclusions makes them less suitable for 
grounding distinctiveness claims. In cases of radical newness, the availability of generalized 
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conclusions will be more limited than in cases of incremental newness. The strength of a warrant 
also depends on the degree of novelty of a business concept. The warrants in the arguments by 
classification used by entrepreneurs who commercialize a product or service that is incrementally 
novel will be stronger than the warrants in arguments from entrepreneurs who launch a more 
radical innovation. We argue that the reason for this difference is that general rules about 
radically novel business concepts have not yet been discovered, so it is hard to apply generalized 
conclusions to the radical innovation. Entrepreneurs who develop a radically novel concept 
therefore have to convince stakeholders that rules about other product categories apply to their 
firm, which can undermine the warrant. 
 
Holt and Macpherson (2010) interviewed Mick, a precision machinist, who used an argument by 
classification when he explained his business-planning activities. Mick realized that his 
customers ‘want plans; they want to see that the business is strong and could survive any 
difficulties that arise’ (Ibid.: 29). Because of this awareness, he decided to put more effort into 
structuring his business activities by starting to keep formal records of continuous improvement. 
Mick claims that these record-keeping activities convinced potential customers that his firm 
stands out from its competitors: ‘no other company that they picked were doing anything like 
that and we got three years out of that’ (Ibid.). In this example, Mick applies a general rule – 
customers are interested in firms that have plans (ground) – to his firm (warrant), claiming that it 
is cognitively distinct because it is one of the few firms that actually keep records of continuous 
improvement, and thus stands out from the competition (claim).  
 
This example illustrates that entrepreneurs who make an incremental change to existing products 
or services do not have the grounds to claim that they are highly distinctive. Mick produces 
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components for the aerospace industry (Holt and Macpherson, 2010), which is an established 
industry. The incremental change he made by structuring his business activities helped him claim 
that the way he runs his business is somewhat distinct, but his activities are still in line with 
existing market conventions (cf. Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001). As a consequence, the warrant of 
Mick’s argument is plausible because he claims a distinctive feature through an argument by 
classification while remaining similar in all other aspects to his competitors. 
 
3.3 Argument by generalization 
Arguments by generalization are inductive and seek ‘in the specific case the law or the structure 
which the example reveals’ (Perelman, 2008: 106). As such, they are the opposite of arguments 
by classification. Whereas arguments by generalization usually refer to data from a sample of 
multiple persons or events (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960), ‘generalizations can also be made 
from individual cases’ (Rieke and Sillars, 2001: 119). Inductive reasoning of this kind helps both 
entrepreneurs and the stakeholders of a new firm ‘achieve some ability to comprehend the 
opportunity for a venture and the future consequences of decisions and actions’ (Cornelissen and 
Clarke, 2010: 544). Therefore, arguments by generalization are suitable instruments for new 
venture founders. 
 
3.3.1 Using arguments by generalization to enhance cognitive legitimacy 
We argue that even in the context of highly novel business concepts, where it is generally harder 
to find grounds to claim legitimacy, new venture founders can use arguments by generalization 
to claim that specific cases or instances that are related to their business concept have a broader 
appeal. While it is often unclear what highly novel products can be used for (Rosa et al., 1999), 
let alone who their users will be, entrepreneurs can skilfully rely on the results of successful test 
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versions or validated prototypes of their product and through generalization claim a broader 
currency for their products. However, unlike these entrepreneurs, new venture founders who 
launch a more incrementally novel business concept can also refer to the results of earlier 
versions of the product, and argue that the new and improved version will prove even more 
successful. In other words, these entrepreneurs often have direct grounds at their disposal for 
constructing a legitimizing argument by generalization.  
 
Whereas, generally speaking, more grounds are available for legitimizing an incrementally novel 
business concept than a radically novel one, we do not expect a difference with respect to 
warrants. Warrants in arguments by generalization are typically strong, regardless of whether the 
venture is a radically or incrementally novel undertaking. The reason for the strength of warrants 
in this type of argument is that the claim and the grounds by definition concern the same 
information – unlike, for example, arguments by analogy and classification (as the previous 
examples illustrate). So provided that an entrepreneur has collected a sufficient amount of 
information to ground the argument, for example based on the performance of a prototype, or the 
results of a pilot, arriving at a plausible conclusion does not depend on the novelty of the 
business concept. Hence, the warrant in an argument by generalization is strong, even when the 
argument is made by an entrepreneur who develops a radically novel business concept. 
 
Prior entrepreneurship research offers illustrations of arguments by generalization when it 
describes how entrepreneurs develop prototypes to convince stakeholders. Ries (2011) provides 
the example of Aardvark, a search engine that complements the factual queries and algorithms of 
Google searches. For example, it provides answers to questions like ‘what’s a good place to go 
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out for a drink after the ball game in my city?’ (Ibid.: 103). The founders of Aardvark used 
prototyping to create grounds for generalizing the broader currency of their engine:  
 
We self-funded the company and released very cheap prototypes to test. What became Aardvark was the 
sixth prototype. Each prototype was a two- to four-week effort. We used humans to replicate the back end as 
much as possible. We invited one hundred to two hundred friends to try the prototypes and measured how 
many of them came back. The results were unambiguously negative until Aardvark (Ries, 2011: 104-105). 
 
This example illustrates how entrepreneurs can use an argument by generalization to help 
stakeholders understand the future consequences of their business concept. The founders of 
Aardvark explain that the current version of the product is the outcome of a process of trial and 
error, and that a sample of trial customers used and appreciated Aardvark (ground). They were 
able to use that information to tell stakeholders that customers will buy and like the product 
when it is released in the market (claim), thus generalizing the evaluations of their trial 
customers to a broader group consisting of all potential customers (warrant).  
 
Because Aardvark is the first search engine that allows people to search for more than just facts, 
the entrepreneurs could not generalize based on the results of previous versions of similar 
products. Instead, they had to rely on the results of their own prototype. The example thus 
suggests that entrepreneurs who introduce a radically novel product have a more limited number 
of grounds at their disposal. It also illustrates that warrants in arguments by generalization are 
typically strong: claiming that people with similar preferences as the ‘one hundred to two 
hundred friends’ who preferred Aardvark over earlier prototypes are likely to be interested in 
using it logically follows from the grounds.  
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3.3.2 Using arguments by generalization to emphasize distinctiveness  
Claiming distinctiveness with an argument by generalization, we argue, can be challenging if a 
new venture develops an incrementally novel business concept because the concept does not 
differ radically from existing concepts. Hence, it is hard to identify the grounds needed to 
support a distinctiveness claim. Entrepreneurs who introduce radically new products or services, 
however, will find it easier to identify the dissimilar aspects of their business concept. These 
entrepreneurs can choose from a larger number of grounds when constructing an argument by 
generalization aimed at emphasizing distinctiveness. As discussed above, warrants in an 
argument by generalization are generally strong, irrespective of the novelty of the business 
concept and irrespective of whether such arguments involve claiming legitimacy or 
distinctiveness. In inductive reasoning, the arguments are derived from the sample itself, so there 
is always a close connection between the business concept and the generalization made.  
 
The case of Enviro Fundraising, documented by Ruebottom (2013), provides an example of how 
arguments by generalization can be used to emphasize distinctiveness. The founders of the 
venture argued:  
 
‘we try to say that our green fundraiser is the best because of specific pieces of our program, like, there’s no 
minimum order, we pay the shipping costs – so, the things that our direct green competitors don’t offer’ 
(Ibid.: 108).  
 
The founders thus present particular aspects of their program, such as the absence of a minimum 
order and shipping costs (ground), as more generally indicative (warrant) of a different business 
proposition (claim). The example illustrates that entrepreneurs who develop an incrementally 
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novel business concept have fewer grounds for claiming distinctiveness through an argument by 
generalization. The founders of Enviro Fundraising claim that their fundraiser is unlike the things 
their competitors offer, but only mention two specific aspects that actually differentiate it. We 
expect that if their business concept had differed more drastically from their competitors’ 
offerings, they would have been able to point out more significant differences. The warrant in 
their argument can be regarded as strong – which we argued is common for arguments by 
generalization – because the claim of the entrepreneurs directly follows from the sample of 
characteristics that distinguish Enviro from other (green) fundraisers. 
 
3.4 Argument by cause 
Rieke and Sillars (2001: 120) state that ‘in western culture we tend to believe that people, things, 
and ideas cause events to take place’. Arguments by cause generally work on the basis that by 
affirming a causal tie between phenomena (Perelman, 2008), a creative or generative power is 
attributed to certain facts about a person, object, event, or condition (Brockriede and Ehninger, 
1960).  
 
3.4.1 Using arguments by cause to enhance cognitive legitimacy  
Entrepreneurs who introduce a radically novel business concept will have few grounds for 
arguments by cause at their disposal because cause and effect relations in novel circumstances 
are typically unknown (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). The novelty of a concept also affects the 
power of warrants in an argument by cause. We argue that the warrant of an argument by cause 
is relatively weak when the argument targets a highly novel business concept because it is 
uncertain if the facts that are used as grounds for this argument will indeed have the expected 
effects.  
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The following example of an argument by cause is derived from Golant and Sillince’s (2007) 
study of the London Lighthouse, an organization providing services to people suffering from 
HIV/AIDS. The entrepreneurs attempted to convince the National Health Service (NHS) of their 
services by stressing that 
 
The Lighthouse will … release significant numbers of beds by taking in end stage patients who would 
otherwise be the responsibility of hospitals … It is clear that the existence of the Lighthouse could do much 
to reduce the approximate average of ₤18,000 that each AIDS patient currently costs the NHS (Ibid.: 1158).  
 
The founders of the London Lighthouse here claim that as an effect (warrant) of their services 
(ground), the NHS will be able to realize cost reductions (claim). In so doing, the entrepreneurs 
provide insight into the relationship between the type of AIDS patients they take care of and the 
availability of hospital beds: by taking in end-stage patients, the Lighthouse organization frees 
the beds these people would otherwise have occupied for acute medical care (Golant and 
Sillince, 2007). The argument by cause thereby makes the services of the London Lighthouse 
more comprehensible, thus contributing to its cognitive legitimacy.  
 
Our example suggests that entrepreneurs who introduce a radically novel business concept have 
fewer grounds at their disposal for constructing arguments by cause. Because the London 
Lighthouse was one of the first organizations to respond to the growing need for care around 
HIV/AIDS (Golant and Sillince, 2007), the ground that its founders used to support their claim is 
only a promise. Because the center had not yet opened (Golant and Sillince, 2007), they could 
not have known for sure how many end-stage AIDS patients they were able to take in. The 
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argument put forward by the founders of the London Lighthouse also illustrates our point 
regarding the strength of warrants in arguments by cause used by entrepreneurs who develop 
radically novel products or services. The NHS may have doubted whether the London 
Lighthouse would be able to release significant numbers of beds, and could have requested 
additional evidence before they decided to support the initiative. In the early stages of the 
initiative, the founders would not have been able to provide this evidence because HIV/AIDS 
treatment yet had to obtain its first results. 
 
3.4.2 Using arguments by cause to emphasize distinctiveness 
In terms of finding grounds for an argument by cause that is used to claim distinctiveness, having 
a radically novel business concept is an advantage. Although accepted facts – which are typically 
used as grounds for arguments by cause (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960) – about highly novel 
concepts are rare due to the lack of proof available about these concepts (Dushnitsky, 2010; Rao 
et al., 2008), most facts an entrepreneur can come up with will be distinctive. However, in cases 
where an entrepreneur can come up with grounds for a distinct causal argument, the lack of proof 
and inadequate knowledge about cause and effect relationships (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) 
may generally undermine the strength of the warrant.  
 
One of the founders of Aspire is an example of an entrepreneur who uses an argument by cause 
to claim distinctiveness. He said: 
‘This is a more sustainable model than a charity, because (…) our revenue is recycled and re-used so that, starting 
from small amounts, we can do more and more’ (Tracey et al., 2011: 65).  
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The entrepreneur argues that as a result (warrant) of tackling the issue of homelessness by 
recycling and reusing revenue (ground), Aspire differs from charities because its business model 
is more sustainable (claim) and leads to progressively more outcomes. The founders of Aspire in 
effect introduced a business logic in an environment that was dominated by charities (Tracey et 
al., 2010). Hence, Aspire’s approach is a radically novel way of dealing with social issues. The 
example illustrates that in a situation of radical novelty many facts can be referred to in order to 
claim distinctiveness. Generating revenue, and subsequently recycling it by reinvesting it in the 
firm, is perhaps not a highly distinctive feature per se, but in the context of Aspire a focus on 
revenue can be presented as highly distinctive.  
 
The example also suggests that the warrants in arguments by cause used to claim distinctiveness 
for a radically novel business concept are generally weak. Because the effects of their own 
business were yet unknown, the founders of Aspire relied on the general idea that their 
businesslike approach was more sustainable than the way charities traditionally addressed the 
problem of homelessness. Because Aspire was one of the first social enterprises (Tracey et al., 
2010), there was little evidence of the effects of these novel organizational forms. The warrant in 
Aspire’s distinctiveness claim was therefore somewhat weak. As a consequence, Aspire’s 
stakeholders may have wondered whether a businesslike approach would indeed amount to 
tackling homelessness in any significant way.  
 
3.5 Argument by sign 
Although ‘argument by sign is closely related to causal argument’ (Rieke and Sillars, 2001: 121), 
it is a different type of argument. Unlike causal arguments, arguments by sign establish a tie 
between elements on unequal levels: a particular characteristic is shown to be the manifestation 
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of a broader phenomenon (Perelman, 2008). Prior research on entrepreneurship recognizes that 
signals, such as an entrepreneur’s financial commitment to his firm (Arthurs et al., 2009; 
DeKinder and Kohli, 2008; Dushnitsky, 2010), can play an important role in getting stakeholders 
to support a new venture.  
 
3.5.1 Using arguments by sign to enhance cognitive legitimacy 
Using an argument by sign to claim legitimacy is complicated for entrepreneurs who introduce a 
radically novel concept. First, potential grounds in arguments by sign are clues or symptoms that 
can be seen as the manifestation of some essential attribute (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960). For 
radically novel business concepts, that essential attribute could be its potential to create a new 
market or its competitiveness. However, because these novel concepts are by definition unlike 
established products or services, we expect that it is more difficult to recognize whether the 
characteristics of these concepts are symptoms of a more essential attribute. Hence, 
entrepreneurs who launch a radically novel product or service have fewer grounds for 
constructing a legitimating argument by sign. Second, we argue that the more novel the product 
or service is, the more difficulties entrepreneurs will face in connecting the grounds to their 
claims, thereby resulting in a weaker warrant. This difficulty stems from a ‘lack of clarity about 
the meaning and implications of particular events or situations’ (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009: 
644) in contexts that are characterized by novelty.  
 
The following example illustrates how an argument by sign can serve to establish the broader 
currency and cognitive legitimacy of a venture. Déjean et al. (2004) studied ARESE, a French 
rating agency specializing in socially responsible investment (SRI). ARESE’s founders tried to 
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help ‘socially responsible fund managers to legitimize themselves within this [financial] 
community’ (Ibid.: 752), by pointing out their rigorous methodology:  
 
‘we have a system of analysis – a complex black calculating box. It gives us a result that’s relevant, and we 
can make sense of the data precisely because we can make correlations, interpret trends’ (Déjean et al., 2004: 
753–754).  
 
By making this statement, the ARESE analysts want to suggest that their use of a ‘complex black 
calculating box’ (ground) indicates (warrant) that ARESE provides ‘a result that is relevant’ 
(claim) and should thus be regarded a serious member of the rating industry. The argument 
illustrates that finding the grounds to construct a legitimizing argument by sign for highly novel 
concepts, like extra-financial ratings (Déjean et al., 2004), is difficult. Instead of referring to a 
symptom specific to their new concept, the ARESE analysts relied on the generic statement that 
the methodology they use is systematic and appropriate. The number of applicable grounds 
would, however, have been larger if the entrepreneurs had started a regular rating agency. In that 
case, they could have referred to the actual results of their methodology as a sign of its relevance. 
 
As in this example, connecting the grounds of an argument to its claim requires making a leap 
from the signs to the underlying essential attributes. However, in this instance, ARESE’s 
stakeholders might question the strength of this warrant. They may, for instance, have wondered 
whether the presence of a complex methodology presented as a ‘black calculating box’ really 
indicates that SRI fits with the working practices within the rating industry. The situation may 
well have been different for a venture in the rating industry that introduced a more incremental 
innovation.  
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3.5.2 Using arguments by sign to emphasize distinctiveness  
With respect to finding grounds to support an argument by sign that is used for emphasizing 
distinctiveness, we argue that entrepreneurs benefit from having a highly novel business concept. 
The inherently unique nature of novel markets (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) provides new 
venture founders who enter or create such markets with ample opportunity to point out 
distinctive characteristics of their firm. We do, however, expect radical novelty to hinder 
entrepreneurs’ ability to plausibly bridge the gap between grounds and claim. Due to the 
uncertain nature of novel market categories (Navis and Glynn, 2011), stakeholders may doubt 
whether the symptom referred to in the ground really is a meaningful signal. Hence, we argue 
that the warrant in arguments by sign is weaker when it relates to radically novel concepts than 
to an incrementally novel product or service.  
 
An example of how an argument by sign can be used to claim distinctiveness is found in a 
document issued by the initiators of the GRI. When discussing the measurement of economic 
performance, GRI states that:  
 
‘In some cases, existing ﬁnancial indicators can directly inform these assessments. However, in other cases, 
different measures may be necessary (…) In this context, shareholders are considered one among several 
stakeholder groups’ (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010: 1100).  
 
Here, the entrepreneurs are suggesting that the ‘different measures’ they use to make assessments 
(ground) are indicative (warrant) of a higher-order phenomenon – in this case a broader view of 
firm performance and corporate social responsibility that includes not only shareholders but also 
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other stakeholders (claim). We argue that if the founders of the GRI had started a reporting 
agency that only assesses the financial performance of organizations they would have been 
unable to refer to the special measures they use as grounds for claiming distinctiveness. The 
example thus suggests that entrepreneurs who introduce a more novel business concept have 
more opportunities to point out the distinctiveness of their firm.  
 
Because the GRI was a novel initiative (Etzion and Ferraro, 2010), the connection that the 
entrepreneurs made between the grounds and their claim is yet unproven, i.e. it is hard for 
stakeholders to assess whether the measures the entrepreneurs refer to will be a meaningful 
symptom of their broader view on corporate social responsibility. As these measures are not well 
established yet, certain stakeholders may therefore doubt whether the adoption of non-financial 
performance measures will indeed make a difference. Hence, the example illustrates that the 
warrants in arguments by sign for distinctiveness claims are weaker for a more novel as opposed 
to incremental business concept. 
 
3.6 Argument from authority 
Each of the arguments we discussed above establishes some logical relationship among 
phenomena in the external world. They are called substantive arguments (Brockriede and 
Ehninger, 1960). Claims can also be justified, however, because they are made by an 
authoritative or credible person. This type of claim is therefore commonly referred to as an 
argument from authority (Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960; Perelman, 2008). Ordinarily, these 
arguments build upon secondary credibility; arguers associate the credibility of someone else in 
relation to themselves (Rieke and Sillars, 2001). Prior entrepreneurship studies indeed found that 
entrepreneurs try to obtain endorsements from credible actors (Deutsch and Ross, 2003; Higgins 
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and Gulati, 2006; Pollock et al., 2010; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002) because, through 
connections with an established or recognized actor, a new venture can benefit from legitimacy 
spillover effects (Chen et al., 2008; Martens et al., 2007; McGaughey, 2007; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Arguments from authority can also employ direct credibility, i.e. ‘the kind of credibility that you 
develop by making direct statements about yourself’ (Rieke and Sillars, 2001: 222). 
Entrepreneurs can develop direct credibility by referring to certain personal characteristics that 
stakeholders evaluate positively, such as significant professional and management experience 
(De Clerq and Voronov, 2011; Tornikowski and Newbert, 2007) or having a diverse skill set 
(Packalen, 2007).  
 
We have discussed how the business concept of a new venture can constrain entrepreneurs’ 
rhetorical freedom. Along the same lines we will illustrate in this section how the novelty of a 
business concept affects entrepreneurs’ ability to construct arguments from authority. Because 
novelty predominantly influences whether other actors are willing to endorse a new venture (Rao 
et al., 2008), our discussion will focus on arguments from authority that build on secondary 
credibility.  
 
3.6.1 Using arguments from authority to enhance cognitive legitimacy  
We argue that nascent entrepreneurs without directly relevant experience who introduce a 
radically novel business concept generally do not possess many grounds to construct arguments 
from authority. Due to their lack of direct credibility, these entrepreneurs have to relate the 
credibility of someone else to their venture in order to make an argument from authority. 
However, as a result of the uncertainty surrounding a firm that develops a highly novel product 
or service, prominent actors are unlikely to endorse it (Hellmann, 2007; Rao et al., 2008). The 
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novelty of a business concept not only limits the availability of grounds for constructing 
arguments from authority, but also reduces the strength of their warrants. Because both grounds 
and warrants in these arguments stress the reliability of the authoritative actor that is being cited 
(Brockriede and Ehninger, 1960), and entrepreneurs who develop a radically novel product or 
service are less likely to obtain endorsements, stakeholders might question whether the 
endorsements these entrepreneurs receive are reliable. Hence, the warrants in arguments from 
authority are indirectly and negatively affected by the novelty of a concept.  
 
The founders of Aspire used several endorsements by highly legitimate actors to convince other 
stakeholders of the legitimacy of their firm. For example, in a letter that Prince Charles, a 
member of the British royal family, sent Aspire he said: ‘homelessness has become a chronic 
problem in society and I was fascinated to read about your proposals to combat it in Bristol’ 
(Tracey et al., 2010: 74). By sharing this quote with their stakeholders, the founders of Aspire 
were able to communicate that authoritative actors (warrant) understand what Aspire is trying to 
achieve (ground). Stakeholders who accept the authority of the person who is cited will also 
believe Aspire’s proposal to be legitimate (claim), even though the entrepreneurs have not 
logically explained it to them. The support from well-known and credible endorsers thus helped 
the founders of Aspire to ‘legitimate their form and logic among key actors in the non-profit and 
for-profit sectors’ (Ibid.).  
 
When Prince Charles wrote his letter, Aspire’s approach to helping the homeless was still novel 
(Tracey et al., 2010). As Aspire’s founders had just graduated from university (Ibid.) they could 
not employ direct credibility. Instead, they relied on the royal endorsement to ground their 
argument from authority. This dependence would have decreased if Aspire had turned out to be 
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successful. In that case, the founders could have leveraged Aspire’s own track record to enhance 
its comprehensibility. The example thus illustrates that there are not many grounds that 
entrepreneurs who develop a radically novel business concept and lack direct credibility can use 
to make a legitimating argument from authority. It also makes clear why stakeholders may 
question the strength of the warrant in an argument from authority. Although Prince Charles is an 
authoritative person, they could doubt whether he is a reliable source of information with respect 
to the proposed solution for fighting homelessness.  
 
3.6.2 Using arguments from authority to emphasize distinctiveness  
While entrepreneurs who introduce an incrementally novel product or service may be better able 
to obtain endorsements from prominent actors in order to legitimize their firm, we argue that it is 
more difficult for them to use secondary credibility to support their distinctiveness claims. The 
reason is that prominent actors will not want to risk their authority by endorsing an implausible 
message or a risky undertaking. But, as argued above, a lower degree of novelty strengthens the 
warrants in an argument from authority because entrepreneurs who launch an incrementally 
novel business concept are more likely to obtain endorsements from relevant actors in their 
immediate environment. Stakeholders will therefore perceive these actors as better equipped to 
say something about the new venture. 
 
Navis and Glynn’s (2010) study of satellite radio firms provides an example of the use of 
secondary credibility to claim distinctiveness. The founders of XM convinced Ludacris, a 
famous hip-hop artist, to support the firm, and subsequently tried to use his endorsement to 
convince other stakeholders that their product offering was distinct from that of their 
competitors. According to XM’s founders, Ludacris’ support was ‘a testament to XM’s 
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commitment to create the best original music programming available on satellite radio’ (Ibid.: 
456). The entrepreneurs thus used Ludacris’ credibility as an artist (warrant) to claim 
distinctiveness from their competition (claim): in contrast to Sirius, the other satellite radio firm 
that focused on sports, Ludacris portrayed XM as a music purist (ground). 
 
The example illustrates our argument that novelty is negatively associated with the number of 
grounds available to back up arguments from authority. By the time the founders of XM 
convinced the hip-hop artist to endorse their firm, the general public had already accepted the 
market for satellite radio (Navis and Glynn 2010), which helped XM find more grounds for 
arguments from authority. If they had not already closed their first deals with large customers, it 
would have been harder to convince celebrities such as Ludacris to endorse their firm because, in 
general, stakeholders ‘are unlikely to grant (…) legitimacy until legitimacy has been granted 
from another source’ (Rutherford and Buller, 2007: 79).  
 
In terms of our example, the expertise of Ludacris was relevant because he is a successful music 
artist. Hence, the warrant is quite strong. Had satellite radio not already been validated by the 
general public (Navis and Glynn, 2010), chances are that music artists would not have supported 
XM due to their lack of knowledge about the business concept, thereby forcing the entrepreneurs 
to rely on the support of more exceptional visionary authorities.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the arguments discussed above: the five substantive arguments, followed by 
the argument from authority. For each argument, we have evaluated its general suitability and 
force in terms of claiming cognitive legitimacy (first two columns) and claiming cognitive 
distinctiveness (last two columns). 
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- Insert table 2 about here -  
 
Table 2 suggests that the novelty of a business concept influences the strength of warrants, albeit 
to a different degree. Arguments by generalization are relatively unaffected by novelty because 
they are based on the novel concept itself. The warrant in the remaining substantive arguments is 
weaker. Although novel markets are inherently ambiguous, arguments based on analogy, 
classification, cause, and sign generally work well in these contexts because entrepreneurs can 
look for grounds outside of their immediate environment. This, however, enhances the gap 
between the grounds and the claim. Why would one in fact assume that evidence from other 
settings would have similar effects? Arguments from authority have a somewhat different 
position because the source of authority is not only affected by substantive arguments, but also 
stems from other human qualities such as the charisma, personal credentials, or reputation of an 
entrepreneur. The effect of the novelty of a business concept on the strength of warrants thus 
reflects the lack of a cognitive anchor on the part of stakeholders evaluating a new venture that 
enters or creates a novel market (Navis and Glynn, 2011).  
 
Some scholars have stated that entrepreneurs who introduce a radically novel concept choose to 
stress its distinctiveness (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; Rindova et al., 2009). With respect to 
warrants, Table 2 shows that it makes no difference whether entrepreneurs stress legitimacy or 
distinctiveness. Regarding grounds, however, a high degree of novelty is an advantage when 
making a distinctiveness claim. A radically novel business concept challenges the status quo 
(Jennings et al., 2009); therefore a larger number of its characteristics can serve as grounds for a 
distinctiveness claim. However, when entrepreneurs want to legitimate a new venture, novelty is 
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an obstacle. Finding grounds to support arguments by classification, generalization, cause, and 
sign is especially difficult when trying to enhance the cognitive legitimacy of a radically novel 
business concept. The grounds for analogies are however relatively unaffected by novelty – 
which marks their potential for legitimizing radically novel ventures and market categories 
(Navis and Glynn, 2011) – and arguments from authority occupy an intermediate position. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Because a new venture is highly dependent upon stakeholders’ assessments (Barreto and Baden-
Fuller, 2006; De Clerq and Voronov, 2009; Zuckerman, 1999), and stakeholders are interested in 
firms that both fit in with and stand out from their environment (e.g. Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; 
Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001; De Clerq and Voronov, 2009), one of the main tasks entrepreneurs 
face is convincing these actors that their firm is legitimately distinct. In this article we have 
outlined how founders of new ventures can use argumentation to convince stakeholders of the 
legitimate distinctiveness of their firm. Below we discuss the implications of our arguments. 
 
First, our work elaborates theory on the range and types of arguments that new venture founders 
have at their disposal to influence stakeholders’ cognitive evaluations of the legitimate 
distinctiveness of their firm. Although prior research in entrepreneurship has established that 
rhetoric is useful to justify a new activity or idea as efficient and effective, appeal to socially 
accepted norms, and excite others’ interests (e.g. Green, 2004; Holt and Macpherson, 2010; 
Ruebottom, 2013), it has to date only provided a limited overview of argument types that 
entrepreneurs use. The role analogies can play in inducing a comprehensible image of a new 
venture has been studied quite extensively (Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010; Etzion and Ferraro, 
2010; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995; Navis and Glynn, 2011), but other arguments have hardly 
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been recognized as a means to convince investors of the legitimate distinctiveness of a new firm. 
Our discussion of analogies suggests that they are, indeed, powerful devices because, when well 
chosen, they provide sufficient grounds to support the entrepreneur’s argument, regardless of the 
novelty of their business. In addition, we demonstrate that a focus on other arguments besides 
analogies is crucial to understand how and when entrepreneurs are able to persuade stakeholders 
to support a burgeoning venture. Our typology includes five additional arguments that have not 
been identified by prior entrepreneurship research. In the paper we discuss each type of argument 
and, specifically, whether and how each of these arguments can be used to claim legitimacy and 
distinctiveness for a new venture, or both.  
 
Second, by considering the rhetorical means by which entrepreneurs can combine legitimacy and 
distinctiveness, we extend prior work on the concept of legitimate distinctiveness. The existing 
literature largely focuses on the achievement or establishment of legitimate distinctiveness as an 
outcome or state (cf. Navis and Glynn, 2010, 2011), but has to date been less specific on the 
actual rhetoric and discourse through which entrepreneurs may shape and influence stakeholder 
assessments. By spelling out the arguments that entrepreneurs make to claim legitimate 
distinctiveness for their ventures we believe that we add necessary detail to the emerging 
literature on this concept within the entrepreneurship field. We also distinguish between 
entrepreneurs who develop a radically novel business concept and entrepreneurs who 
commercialize an incrementally novel business concept. The ventures of entrepreneurs who 
introduce a radically novel business concept are unlikely to meet the minimum standards for 
membership of a certain category because they are often too cognitively distinct from other 
category members. We argue that these entrepreneurs face difficulties identifying the grounds or 
evidence for making legitimating claims and, therefore, also encounter problems in establishing a 
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plausible connection between these grounds and the claim. Their best chances for success are in 
building arguments from generalization to establish a category and context for their venture. 
New ventures started by entrepreneurs who commercialize an incremental innovation are more 
likely to be assigned to a taken-for-granted market category by their stakeholders. The 
entrepreneurs can therefore start to try to differentiate it from other category members within the 
constraints set by the institutional environment (cf. Bitektine, 2011; Navis and Glynn, 2010). We 
argue however that they have fewer grounds available for claiming distinctiveness, but are 
generally able to construct arguments with a strong warrant that suggest that their undertaking is 
legitimate and feasible from within the current market constraints. 
 
Third, our work contributes to the growing stream of research that takes a linguistic approach to 
the study of entrepreneurship. Although it took some time before the linguistic turn in the social 
sciences found its way into organization studies (Phillips and Oswick, 2012), research on 
‘entrepreneurship now increasingly turns to narrative approaches’ (Steyaert, 2007: 742). 
Studying the language of entrepreneurs enables researchers to address issues that ‘are concerned 
with entrepreneurial intentions and actions and their interrelationships with circumstance’ 
(Gartner, 2010: 12), and thus helps explain the mechanisms through which entrepreneurial 
phenomena occur (Martens et al., 2007). We have outlined how nascent entrepreneurs may use 
six different types of argument to convince stakeholders of the legitimate distinctiveness of a 
new venture. A focus on arguments we believe complements prior research that has largely 
focused on broader discursive approaches, such as narratives or discourse (Gartner, 2010), or as 
mentioned has focused in a narrow and exclusive way on particular types of argument, such as 
analogy. Our rhetoric-informed perspective, however, provides a broader overview of the micro-
processes of argumentation that are used by entrepreneurs to claim legitimate distinctiveness for 
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their ventures. In drawing on the field of rhetoric, we signal the fruitfulness of an alternative, 
micro-approach to the role of language in entrepreneurship.  
 
This approach, together with the typology, provides a coherent theoretical base for further micro-
level research that traces how arguments are used to gain and sustain stakeholder support for 
their organization. A process study of a sample of new venture founders or managers may be a 
promising way to flesh out our ideas. Such a study could track how the use of arguments 
develops over time in line with the evolution of the venture and its market category. This kind of 
research can then also establish to what extent the reliance on specific types of arguments (such 
as analogy) is being trumped over time by the information that becomes available on the 
performance of the venture (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Cornelissen and Clarke, 2010). Another, yet 
related, focus for a process study may be the extent to which argumentation, like narratives 
(Corvellec and Risberg, 2007; Golant and Sillince, 2007), is modified to appeal to the desires of 
specific audiences. Within the context of entrepreneurship, stakeholders may respond differently 
to new ventures that develop a radically innovative product or service. Whereas some may be 
skeptical of committing to such ventures, other stakeholders ‘exhibit a strong affective 
congruence to innovation and newness’ (Choi and Shepherd, 2005: 579). It may therefore be that 
entrepreneurs adapt their argumentation depending on the stakeholder audiences that they 
address and the feedback that they receive from them.  
 
Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that the examples that we have discussed suggest that 
entrepreneurs may primarily be using one type of argument as the most salient form of rhetoric 
that they use to convince stakeholders. Future research can, however, also explore how 
individual arguments may be connected as part of broader rhetorical strategies employed by 
43 
entrepreneurs. For example, further research may involve in-depth argumentation analyses of 
pitches. Such research may then identify patterns in argumentation and explore whether and how 
individual arguments may cohere into a meaningful whole (Chen et al., 2009; Maguire et al., 
2004). Finally, future studies may also address how the use of argumentation connects to the use 
of other rhetorical devices, such as the introduction of relevant terms from dominant discourses 
(Arbuthnott et al., 2010; Navis and Glynn, 2011), or non-verbal symbols, such as office furniture 
or framed patents (Clarke, 2011), gestures (Cornelissen et al., 2012), and the ability to express 
emotions (Baron and Markman, 2003).  
 
In conclusion, we delimited our scope in this paper to the cognitive dimension of legitimate 
distinctiveness, consistent with prior research (Navis and Glynn, 2010; Navis and Glynn, 2011). 
Yet, prior research has also started to hint at the fact that in some instances being cognitively 
legitimate or ‘just being different clearly is not enough’ (King and Whetten, 2008: 204). That is, 
stakeholders may also mobilize normative values and ideologies when they assess ventures, and 
indeed they may judge a venture on the basis of its so-called sociopolitical legitimacy – its 
resonance and alignment with broader societal values – over and beyond its cognitive legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995). Such norms may be particularly salient when judging a social venture or a 
venture with a direct or indirect impact on a range of stakeholders. Prior research suggests that 
such normative assessments fundamentally build on cognitive distinctions (Haack et al., 2014; 
Bitektine, 2011), and can thus be made salient by the very same arguments that entrepreneurs use 
to establish a cognitive basis for their ventures. Indeed, assessments of broader societal value, in 
line with specific norms and ideologies, are often seen as second-order effects that can only be 
realized when cognitive legitimacy has already been achieved (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Such 
assessments then in turn reflect as much the stakeholder audience (and the norms and values they 
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have) as the key characteristics of the venture itself. Future research can address this limitation of 
our paper and specifically explore whether and how sociopolitical legitimacy builds on 
assessments of the cognitive aspects of legitimate distinctiveness.  
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Table 1: Legitimating and distinguishing effects of different types of argument
Type of 
argument Claim Legitimating effect  Distinguishing effect Prior research 
Analogy 
‘A specific characteristic 
found in one situation 
also exists in the 
analogous situation’ 
(Rieke & Sillars, 2001: 
122) 
Positioning new venture 
within a taken-for-
granted market category 
by stressing similarities 
with established members 
of that category  
Positioning new venture 
within the category of 
distinctive organizations 
by stressing similarities 
with organizations that 
are known for their 
distinctiveness 
The use of analogies has 
been studied by 
Cornelissen and Clarke, 
2011; Etzion and Ferraro, 
2010; Navis and Glynn, 
2011  
Classification 
A generalized conclusion 
about known members of 
a class is claimed to ‘also 
be true of a hitherto 
unexamined item’ 
(Brockriede & Ehninger, 
1960: 50) 
Positioning new venture 
within a taken-for-
granted market category 
by applying a generalized 
conclusion about 
members of that category 
to the new venture 
Positioning new venture 
within the category of 
distinctive organizations 
by applying generalized 
conclusion about 
members of that category 
to the new venture 
The legitimating effect of 
category membership has 
been recognized by 
Khaire and Wadhwani, 
2010; Porac et al., 1995 
Generalization 
‘What is true of the items 
constituting the sample 
will also be true of 
additional members of the 
class’ (Brockriede & 
Ehninger, 1960: 49)  
Inducing images of how a 
new venture is likely to 
function as an established 
member of an industry  
Inducing images of how a 
new venture is likely to 
change or create an 
industry 
Inductive reasoning has 
been addressed as 
important to new venture 
founders in the studies on 
analogy  
Cause 
An ‘affirmation of a 
causal tie between 
phenomena’ (Perelman, 
2008: 81) 
Explaining how the 
activities of a new 
venture have certain 
expected effects 
Explaining how the 
activities of a new 
venture have certain 
distinctive effects 
Causal reasoning has 
been identified as a 
dominant way of thinking 
about creation (e.g. 
Sarasvathy, 2001) 
Sign 
A particular characteristic 
is claimed to be the 
manifestation of a larger 
phenomenon (Perelman, 
2008) 
Positioning new venture 
within a taken-for-
granted market category 
by emphasizing that the 
new venture possesses 
some symptoms of 
membership 
Positioning new venture 
within the category of 
distinctive organizations 
by emphasizing that the 
new venture possesses 
some symptoms of 
membership 
Many studies on 
entrepreneurship have 
used signaling theory 
(e.g. Arthurs et al., 2009; 
DeKinder and Kohli, 
2008; Dushnitsky, 2010) 
Authority 
‘A claim is justified 
because it is held by a 
credible person’ (Rieke & 
Sillars, 2001: 123–124): 
yourself 
Citing a credible actor 
who understands that the 
new venture belongs to a 
taken-for-granted market 
category 
Citing a credible actor 
who believes that the new 
venture stands out from 
other organizations 
Several studies have 
pointed to the positive 
effect of endorsement by 
authorities (e.g. Higgins 
and Gulati, 2006; Pollock 
et al., 2010) 
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Type of 
argument 
Claiming cognitive legitimacy for new ventures that develop a Claiming distinctiveness for new ventures that develop a 
Incrementally novel                                                 Radically novel 
business concept                                                       business concept 
Incrementally novel                                                           Radically novel 
business concept                                                                 business concept 
Analogy 
Ground: sufficient number of similar 
concepts 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to similarity 
with comparable concepts 
Ground: sufficient number of similar 
concepts 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to bigger 
differences with comparable concepts 
Ground: sufficient number of 
concepts that are similarly distinctive  
 
Warrant: stronger, due to similarity 
to other concepts 
Ground: sufficient number of concepts 
that are similarly distinctive  
 
Warrant: weaker, due to differences 
with other concepts 
Classification 
Ground: general availability of 
suitable conclusions about taken-for-
granted categories 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to fit within 
category 
Ground: limited availability of 
suitable conclusions about novel 
categories  
 
Warrant: weaker, due to lack of clarity 
about fit within category 
Ground: suitable conclusions about 
taken-for-granted categories do not 
articulate its distinctive aspects  
 
Warrant: stronger, due to fit within 
category 
Ground: limited availability of 
suitable conclusions about novel 
categories 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to lack of clarity 
about fit within category 
Generalization 
Ground: more generalizable data 
available  
 
Warrant: strong, due to close fit data 
and conclusion 
Ground: less generalizable data 
available  
 
Warrant: strong, due to close fit data 
and conclusion 
Ground: available data less suitable 
to establish newness of new category 
 
Warrant: strong, due to close fit data 
and the newly established category 
Ground: available data more suitable 
to establish newness of new category 
 
Warrant: strong, due to close fit data 
and the newly established category 
Cause 
Ground: more known features that 
may have causal power 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to knowledge 
of cause-effect relationships 
Ground: less known features that may 
have causal power 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to uncertainty 
about cause-effect relationships 
Ground: fewer features that indicate 
the concept has distinctive effects 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to knowledge 
of cause-effect relationships 
Ground: more features that indicate 
the concept has distinctive effects 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to uncertainty 
about cause-effect relationships 
Sign 
Ground: more known symptoms of 
essential attributes 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to knowledge 
about significance of symptoms 
Ground: less known symptoms of 
essential attributes 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to uncertainty 
about significance of symptoms 
Ground: fewer symptoms of 
distinctiveness 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to knowledge 
about significance of symptoms 
Ground: more symptoms of 
distinctiveness 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to uncertainty 
about significance of symptoms 
Authority 
Ground: more authorities can 
support cognitive legitimacy 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to credibility 
of authorities 
Ground: fewer authorities can support 
cognitive legitimacy 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to questionable 
credibility of authorities 
Ground: fewer authorities view 
concept as different 
 
Warrant: stronger, due to credibility 
of authorities 
Ground: more authorities view 
concept as different 
 
Warrant: weaker, due to questionable 
credibility of authorities 
Table 2: The influence of business concept novelty on new venture founders’ ability to use arguments 
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Figure 1: The basic structure of argumentation 
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